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3Introduction - China’s Rural Development
With Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the late 1970s China started its spectacular transi-
tion from a state-run economy, based on centralized command and control, to a modern eco-
nomic system based on market principles and international cooperation. The first phase in these
reforms was the introduction of the “household responsibility system” in the early 1980s, which
essentially abandonded the system of communal farming and re-established the autonomy of
the individual farm household. Millions of peasants were given the freedom (and responsibility)
to plan and organize most of their production. They were no longer ordered around in semi-
military formations to cultivate collectivized fields, dig irrigation canals, build dams, or even
produce steel in backyard furnices, as was the case during the “Great Leap Forward”.
They were no longer coerced  into unproductive cultivation by “Grain First” policies and strictly
fixed grain quotas, which often forced them to produce crops under most unsuitable conditions.
Now they could switch to the production of more profitable products, such as vegetables, fruits,
tobacco or cotton, run fishponds or breed animals; and they could sell part of their production on
free markets. They (or more often their children) could accept off-farm jobs in the emerging
village industries, and they could join the millions of temporary migrants who went for labor in
east-coast cities. With their remittances they greatly contributed to the economic development
in the rural areas.
We often tend to forget, that China’s spectacular economic growth in manufacturing industries
and service sectors during the past 15 years was actually based on a fundamental reform of the
agricultural sector almost 30 years ago. After decades of collectivization, mass campaigns and
political indoctrination, farmers were allowed to make their own decisions and carry out their
own initiatives. It was essentially the (cautious) introduction of  entrepreneurial freedom (even
if these words were never used) among millions of peasants. One of the biggest and most rapid
rural development programs in human history was not triggered by huge public investments in
infrastructure, or education or public spending, but by a change in the mentality among the
leading cadres, who had learned to understand Deng’s saying that it is “not important whether a
cat is gray or black, as long as it catches mice”. It was the pragmatic recognition that the Chinese
agriculture can only develop, if farmers have the freedom to make their own (economic) deci-
sions.
As a consequence of this fundamental change in policy, China’s food supply greatly improved
and the rural areas began to develop. Millions of peasants were lifted out of poverty. The aver-
age annual net income of rural households (in constant 1978 prices) more than doubled - from
343.4 RMB in 1978 to 735.7 RMB in 2003 (see Figure 2, left side and Tables A1 and A2 in the
Appendix). In fact, the ratio between real urban and rural income improved considerably be-
tween 1978 and 1988: While the urban income in 1978 was almost 2.6  times higer than the rural
income, it was only 1.5 times higher in 1988. In the first decade of economic reform, between
1978 and 1988, the income gap between rural and urban areas began to narrow. However, since
1989, the urban-rural income gap was widening again; and in 2003, the urban income was again
2.4 times higher than the rural income (see Figure 2, right side and Table A3 in the Appendix).
Moreover, there are huge regional divergences in both the rural and urban income growth. In
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, both rural and urban incomes are much
higher than in Ningxia, Guizhou, Gansu, Shaanxi, Tibet, Yunnan or Heilongjiang. By far the
4Figure 2: Average Annual Per Capita Income of Rural and Urban Households by Province, 2003
Rural Households Urban Households
Source:
China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 10-21 and Table 10-15
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Notes:
Rural Net Income refers to the total income of permanent residents of rural households during a year, after deduction of
expenses for productive and non-productive business operations, payment of taxes and payment to collective units for their
contracted tasks. It also includes the income from non-business operations, such as money remitted by household members
who are in other places (migrant workers), government relief payments and various subsidies. It is an indicator that shows the
actual level of income of rural households.
Urban Disposable Income refers to the actual income of urban households, which can be used for daily expenses. It equals the
total income plus household subsidies, minus personal income tax and expenditures on household sideline production.
Both the rural and urban income is real income in 1978 constant prices.
Source:
China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 10-2. The Real Net (Disposable) Income was calculated by multiplying the real income
index by the nominal income value of the base year (1978) provided in Table 10-2.
Figure 1: Average Annual Per Capita Income of Rural and Urban Households; Urban-Rural Ratio, 1978-
2001
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5Figure 3: Urban-Rural Ratio in Average Annual Per Capita Income by Province, 2003
Source:
China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 10-21 and Table 10-15.
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biggest gap between rural and urban income was reported from Tibet, where, in 2003, urban
households had more than 5 times the income of rural households. A very high income gap was
also reported from Yunnan, Guizou, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Guangxi and Changqing. On the
other hand, Jiangsu had the smallest rural-urban income gap in 2003, where urban households
had roughly twice the per capita income of rural households. Relatively small rural-urban in-
come gaps were also reported from Shanghai, Tianjin, Zheijiang and Liaoning.
In conclusion, we can identify three rural-urban income trends in China:
? China’s rural population had significant income growth in real terms since 1978. This
clearly improved the situation of hundreds of millions of peasants in the country.
? The rural-urban income gap, which was declining between 1978 and 1988, has been
widening since 1989 and is now almost at the same level as in 1978. However, the recent
reform of the agricultural tax might stop or even reverse this widening of the rural-urban
income gap.
? There is a huge regional variation in rural-urban income gap. Eastern and southern prov-
inces have a much smaller rural-urban income gap than provinces in central, northern and
western China. This indicates, that high economic growth in the urban-industrial centers of
eastern and southern China had some trickle-down effects on the adjacent rural areas -
most likely due to remittances of migrant workers.
6Poverty in China
While the spectacular growth of China’s agriculture - particularly in the first decade after the
1978/79 reforms -  has significantly improved the situation in rural areas, not everyone could
participate. According to China’s own estimates there were still some 26 million people living
in extreme poverty in 2004; and about 76 million were below the official low-income line of
924 yuan per person per year (see Table 1 and Figure 4). The Office of Poverty Alleviation and
Development at the State Council Leading Group has published an official list of “poverty
counties” that receive special support for poverty alleviation. As can be seen from Map 1, these
counties are concentrated in a poverty belt that stretches from the Northeast to the Southwest
and from the center of China to the far western province of Southern Xinjiang.
We have used our Geographical Information System (GIS) to aggregate county-level statistics
for poverty and non-poverty counties (see Table 2). Unfortunately, we had access to only a very
limited set of geographic and geo-physical data at county level. While the officially designated
poverty counties can be found almost everywhere in China - from the far North to the most
Southern provinces and from the Center to the Far West (see Map 1) – they still have some
remarkable geo-physical similarities. Most poverty counties are located in mountain areas. On
Note: This map includes the 592 key counties for poverty alleviation and development plus the 74 counties of
Tibet, which are also included in the large-scale integrated government action to combat poverty. Please note that
the map cannot show 9 very small rural town districts, which are also included in the poverty program.
Source:  The State Council Leading Group, Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, May 14, 2004
Map 1: Key counties for poverty alleviation and development, 2001
7Table 1: Number of Rural Poor based on Poverty Line and Low-Income Line, 1978 - 2004
Note: This table displays the official poverty headcount in China, based on the coresponding poverty line and low-
income cut-off lines. The poverty line was increased from 100 yuan per person per year in 1978 to 668 yuan in
2004. Poverty statistics based on the low-income line are available since 2000, when the cut-off point was at 865
yuan per person per year. Since then the low-income line was increased to 924 yuan. According to these critieria,
the most severe poverty in China was reduced from 250 million in 1978 to 26 million in 2004 (based on poverty
line) and from 95 million in 2000 to 76 million in 2004 (based on the low-income line).
Source (1)
Cut-off 
Line
Number of 
Poor
Cut-off 
Line
Number of 
Poor 
(additional)
Total
1978 100 250.0
1984 200 128.0
1985 206 125.0
1986 213 131.0
1987 227 122.0
1988 236 96.0
1989 259 102.0
1990 300 85.0
1992 317 80.0
1994 450 70.0
1995 530 65.4
1997 640 49.6
1998 635 42.1
1999 625 34.1
2000 625 32.1 865 62.1 94.2
2001 630 29.2 872 61.0 90.2
2002 627 28.2 869 58.3 86.5
2003 637 29.0 882 56.2 85.2
2004 668 26.1 924 49.8 75.9
Sources
(1) National Bureau of Statistics of China, Rural Survey Organization, 2004: 
Poverty Statistics in China (September 2004), p. 9
(2) National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005 (May 13): Communique on 2004 
Rural Poverty Monitoring of China. Beijing (Downloaded: September 15, 2005 from 
the official NBS web site at: www.stats.gov.cn)
Year
Poverty Line
Source (1)
Low-Income Line
Source (2)
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Figure 4: Number of Rural Poor based on Poverty Line and Low-Income Line, 1978 - 2004
8Table 2: Selected indicators at county-level, 2001
Source: Calculation by the authors, based on GIS
Indicators Non-Poverty Counties
Poverty 
Counties
Economy
GDP (yuan per capita) 5,050.1 2,689.5
GDP of primary industry (yuan per capita) 1,390.4 1,084.2
GDP of secondary industry  (yuan per capita) 2,038.3 782.4
Employment in tertiary sector (in % of all employed) 19.8 11.1
Employment in secondary sector (in % of all employed) 15.8 4.9
Government expenditures  (yuan per capita) 385.2 452.4
Non-agricultural population (in % of total population) 24.3 11.7
Education
Student enrollment of secondary schools (in % of total population) 5.1 4.7
Student enrollment of primary schools (in % of total population) 8.9 12.3
Illiterate population (in % of total population age 15 and older) 9.6 20.7
Population with no school (in percent of population age 6+) 7.5 16.4
Population with college degree (in percent of population age 6+) 0.75 0.19
Average years at school 7.5 6.0
Demography
Total population (in million) /1 1,057 211
Population density (persons per km2) 787.6 144.6
Ethnic Minority population (in % of total population) 10.7 39.3
Rural population (in % of total population) 65.7 85.3
Birth rate (birth per 1000 of the population) 11.6 15.6
Natural growth rate (per 1000 of the population) 5.7 8.6
Death rate (per 1000 of the population) 5.9 7.0
Total fertility rate (TFR) (from 9.5% sample survey) 1.27 1.71
Infrastructure
Road length (m per km2 of land area) 99 68
Hospital beds (per county) 737 451
Hospital beds (per 10,000 of the population) 17.5 16.6
Hospital beds (per km2 of land area) 0.71 0.2
Households with telephone (in % of all households) 28.4 16.5
Households without tab water (in % of all households) 5.3 7.4
Households with bath facility (in % of all households) 2.3 0.8
Households with WC (in % of all households) 6.6 5.9
Agriculture
Cultivated land (in % of total land area) 40.1 20.7
Per capita cultivated land (hectare per person) 0.201 0.195
Average grain yield (kg per hectare) 4,896 3,399
Physical Characteristics (climate, topography)
Slope above 8 degree % 36.1 72.2
Slope above 15 degree % 29.2 60.3
Slope above 30 degree % 14.6 29.3
Average altitude (in meters) 566 1,633
Average precipitation (in mm per year) 972 825
Accumulated temperature (?10 degree celsius per year) 4,356 3,217
Average temperature of warmest month in the area (degree celsius) 29 25
Average temperature of coldest month in the area (degree celsius) -7 -10
9average, 72 percent of their area is covered with slopes above 6 degrees, as compared to just 36
percent in non-poverty counties. More than 60% of the area in poverty counties, on average, is
covered by slopes with more than 15 degrees, versus 29 percent in non-poverty areas. Very steep
terrain with slopes above 30 degrees covers almost 30 percent of the area in poverty counties –
as compared to just 15 percent in non-poverty counties (see Table 1). The average altitude of
poverty counties is three times higher than that of non-poverty counties – 1633 meters as com-
pared to 566 meters (see Map 2). Poverty counties have also cooler climate: the cumulated
temperature above 10 degrees Celsius is 3,217 versus 4,356 for non-poverty counties. These
data show that poverty counties have much harsher natural conditions than non-poverty coun-
ties. Table 2 highlights some of the advantages and disadvantages of the various regions.
As can be seen from Map 1, there is not a single poverty county in China’s costal regions. It
seems that both rural counties and urban areas in coastal provinces have several “natural” and
economic advantages – such as close distance to a sea harbor, which is increasingly important
for China’s rapidly growing export industry. China’s high-growth coastal regions (Guangdong,
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin) are also charactericed by growing middle-class populations, which
form large domestic consumer markets. The distance from the producers to these increasingly
wealthy domestic consumers is typically much larger in China’s Interior or Western provinces
than in coastal regions.
Map 2: China’s Topography -  A Shaded Countour Map based on DEM Data
Data Source: U.S. Geological Survey, EROS Data Center: GTOPO30 Digital Elevation Model (Data downloaded from EROS
web site) Note: These maps are based on the 30 Arc seconds (approximately 1 kilometer) elevation grid data from the EROS
data center.
10
China’s Western provinces are land-locked and separated from the Chinese “heartland” in the
East. Many counties in the far western part of Xinjiang, for instance, are separated by the
Taklimakan desert from the main population centers. They are also separated by mountain ridges
from the neighboring countries of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. These physical characteristics
of distance, altitude, landform, and climate as well as the economic disadvantages of market-
distance may explain why counties in interior and western regions of China will probably never
be able to reach the same development level as counties in the coastal provinces.
The (relative) success story or rural income growth, outlined above, cannot hide the fact that
pockets of severe poverty still exist in China’s rural areas – particularly in the central and west-
ern parts of the country. The trickle-down effects of the spectacular economic growth in
Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing or Tianjin did not reach the more remote parts of the country.
Available data seem to indicate that natural conditions are often responsible for the persistence
of poverty in China. For instance, topography is certainly an important factor. Poor people in
China usually live in remote mountain areas – frequently at high altitude or on steep terrain. The
infrastructure is usually bad. Villages in poverty areas have poor roads, unstable or lacking
electricity and telecommunication, and few facilities for education, training, and health care.
While only 10% of the population in non-poverty counties was illiterate in 2001, it was almost
40% in poverty counties.
Poverty in China is certainly also climate-related. Statistics on crop production values in Yuan
per hectare (see Map 4) indicate that the arid and semi-arid areas west of Beijing, reaching down
to Ningxia and further west to Gansu, have the lowest agricultural productivity - primarily due
to harsh agro-climatic conditions.  As we can see from a precipitation map (see Map 3), these
areas typically get less than 600 mm of rainfall per year, which makes it impossible or highly
difficult to cultivate crops under rain-fed conditions.
Labor opportunities outside of agriculture are very scarce in poverty countries. Only few people
are employed in industry or service sectors. The villages of poverty counties are typically sepa-
rated from regions with modern manufacturing industries and wealthy consumer markets by
long distance, insufficient infrastructure or natural barriers, such as mountain ridges, deserts,
swampy lands, or mighty rivers.
Finally, it seems that ethnic and cultural factors are associated with persistant poverty in China
– almost all designated poverty counties have a high percentage of minority population. On
average, the percentage of minority population in poverty counties was four times higher than in
non-poverty counties (see Table 1 and 2).
Poverty Alleviation
To combat poverty under these special conditions, targeted programs are necessary. Below, we
will discuss several development measures that seem to have special relevance for promoting
development in the poverty areas of central and western regions.
1. Subsidized Loans for Poor People
To combat poverty, the Chinese government has established a program on poverty alleviation.
In 2001, it included 592 key counties plus the 74 counties of Tibet. Most of the poverty counties
are located in China’s Central and Western provinces (see Map 1).
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Since 1986, China’s government has implemented a scheme for providing subsidized loans to
poor people. The County Poverty Alleviation Offices are selecting projects, which have to be
approved by the “County Leading Group Offices for Economic Development in Poor Areas”.
According to Wu Guabao of the Rural Development Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, the annual amount of subsidized loans has increased from 1.05 billion RMB in 1986
to 5.5 billion RMB in 1996 (Wu, undated).
Unfortunately, these subsidized loans have not always found their way into the hands of poor
people. Since the local governments have the authority to select projects for receiving subsi-
dized loans, it sometimes happens that county- or township-operated enterprises, rather than
individual households, are selected. Poverty loans are thus misused to subsidize (unproductive)
township enterprises. Guobao Wu has argued that the “Chinese poverty alleviation strategy is
basically a trickle-down regional economic development strategy, in which the income growth
of poor households is expected to be realized via regional economic development”. It seems,
that a “privatization” of poverty loans could streamline the government efforts to alleviate pov-
erty. Loans should be allocated to individual (farm) households rather than to “projects” – which
are often just unproductive village or township enterprises. The concept of individual “micro
Map 3: Average Annual Precipiation in China: Area with Precipitation of more than 600 mm
This map was developed at the IIASA LUC Project. Primary Data Sources: Leemans, R. and W. Cramer, 1991, The IIASA
database for mean monthly values of temperature, precipitation and cloudiness on a global terrestrial grid, IIASA Report, RR-
91-18, Laxenburg, 63pp. And: Institute of Soil Science, Accademia Sinica, 1986, The Soil Atlas of China, Cartographic
Publishing House, Beijing, p. 6
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credits” as promoted by the World Bank may be more effective in poverty alleviation than the
project-based subsidized loan program adopted by the Chinese government.
2. Food for Work Program
Another program of the Chinese government to combat poverty is the “Food for Work” scheme.
Between 1986 and 1997 the central government spent some 33.6 billion Yuan RMB in the “Food
for Work” program. Apparently, the government has second thoughts about the efficiency of the
program, because it was downsized considerably since 1994/95, when more than 6 billion annu-
ally were spent, as compared to only 3 billion in 1996/97. Initially the “Food for Work” pro-
grams were focused on infrastructure construction, such as the building of roads and drinking
water systems. However, by the late 1980s these programs also included infrastructure projects
in agriculture.
In general, “Food for Work” programs have a serious disadvantage: The work is provided by
some kind of collective development scheme that may, or may not, be in the best interest of
individual households. Local leaders may be more interested in using the funds for implement-
Map 4: Crop cultivation in China: Crop production value (in Yuan / hectare)
This map was developed by the IIASA LUC-Project. Primary Data Sources: (1) State Land Administration of the People’s
Republic of China / United Nations Development Program / State Science and Technology Commission of the People’s
Republic of China / Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: Land Resources - Use and Productivity
Assessment in China. Project CPR/87/029, Beijing, 1994. (2) Institute for Remote Sensing Applications: Land-cover map of
China. Beijing, 1994
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ing some prestige project, which gives them political gratification, than in actually providing
long-term benefits for the poor. The initiative is actually taken away from the poor; because they
are essentially laborers in projects designed by others.
3. Agricultural Tax Reform / Agricultural Subsidies
After de-collectivization of the agriculture and the introduction of the “household responsibility
system”, the financial basis of villages and local cadres in China had deteriorated considerably.
Previously, agricultural income was shared by the collective, and thus could also provide in-
come for the village administration and the local cadres; now it belonged to the individual farm
household. While townships and counties received government funds from a revenue-sharing
system, the villages and local cadres were left on their own. As a consequence they began to
introduce or increase various fees and levies. Apart from the profit of village enterprises, these
village-retained fees became the only legitimate source of income for the village.
During the mid-1990s the situation of the farmers in China became increasingly serious when
they were more and more suffering under the combined burden of agricultural tax and village-
retained fees. According to estimates by Aubert and Li, the percentage of taxes and  fees in the
farmers’ income increased from 9.3% in 1990 to 12.2% in 1994. Local cadres became increas-
ingly “creative” in inventing all kinds of new levies and fees. Concerned with rising discontent
among farmers, the government began to reform its century-old system of agricultural taxes.
In a first step the “Tax-for-Fee” reform was introduced. It began in 2000 as an experiment in
Anhui province. The objective was to replace the various fees with one unified agricultural tax
- based on the size of the cultivated area. While the tax was (slightly) increased, all other fees
and levies should have been reduced or removed. This reform had some success in removing the
most outrageous burdens, but it was apparently not radical enough. The central government
became increasingly concerned that the WTO accession of China might overburden the farmers
and thus decided in March 2004 to completely remove agricultural taxes within 5 years. Subse-
quently, in January 2005, the government decided to speed up this process and the taxing of
agriculture was stopped in 25 provinces.
In addition the government also decided to introduce - for the first time - agricultural subsidies.
According to the new agricultural policy of 2004 farmers would receive direct payments for
grain cultivation, subsidies for high-quality grains and soybeans, and subsidies for the purchase
of machinery. The government also decided to increase funds for rural infrastructure, such as
irrigation facilities, electricity generation, roads, etc. Fred Gale and co-authors have estimated
that the new agricultural policy in China allocated funds equivalent to at least 25 billion US$
(Gale, et al. 2005, 3).
It is obvious that these reforms can certainly help to increase farmers income. They might even
close the gap between rural and urban areas, which has been widening since 1979 (as we have
shown above). However, they will do little to alleviate poverty in China. These reforms are
clearly targeted to the farmers in the main grain producing areas. However, many of China’s
poor live outside the major agricultural regions. Some are nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes that
live from animal husbandry. They have already paid little or no taxes, because they live in very
remote areas with low administrative density. Reducing or removing taxes will not significantly
improve their situation.
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4. Grain for Green Program
In 1999, China started the “Grain for Green” program, one of the most ambitious conservation
schemes in the developing world to prevent soil erosion – primarily through reforestation of
grain land or conversion into grassland. While the main target of the program is to improve the
environment, it has important side effects for economic development and poverty alleviation
(Uchida / Xu / Rozelle, 2004).
The scale of the program is quite impressive: According to plan, almost 15 million hectares of
cropland should be set aside for reforestation or conversion into grassland; of which more than
4 million hectares should be on steep slopes with at least 25 degrees (World Wildlife Fund,
2003). Farmers, who set aside these crop areas, are compensated in cash, grain, and seedlings.
Each farmer receives 1500 to 2250 kg of grain per hectare per year, 300 Yuan RMB per hectare
per year in cash payment, and free seedlings (worth approximately 750 Yuan RMB) at the be-
ginning of the conversion program (Uchida / Xu / Rozelle, 2004, p.8). The program is carried
out in more than 20 provinces; there is a strong geographical focus on the upper and middle
reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow river.
Emi Uchida, Jintao Xu, and Scott Rozelle have undertaken a cost-effectiveness and sustainability
study of the “Grain for Green” program. Among other things, they found that the program is a
“win-win proposition at least in the short-run. Not only does the program provide higher in-
comes but the farm households have access to additional family labor that is now not needed for
use on the set-aside plots.” (Uchida / Xu / Rozelle, 2004, p.17). The Grain for Green program, in
fact, might be considered a valuable tool for poverty alleviation, since it is targeted to mountain
areas with steep slopes – areas, which are often cultivated by the poorest farmers.
However, there are several fundamental problems, which make the Grain for Green program
unsuitable for combating poverty:
? The program is not targeted to poverty areas, but to areas with soil erosion. While there is a
certain overlap between the two, we can still find many places with poverty where the
program criteria for reforestation would not be applicable.
? The program is focused on farmers, who are compensated for setting aside some of their
(marginal) cropland. Many poverty areas, however, are located in arid or semi-arid grass-
lands with little or no crop cultivation.
? Areas for the Grain for Green program have to be monitored by the local administration to
make sure the criteria for compensation are met. This may be the reason, why Grain for
Green areas are often located along roads. Many poor people, however, are living in very
remote areas, where the local administration is rarely seen.
? The Grain for Green program allows the planting of some 20% of “economic trees” which
the farmers could use commercially (in contrast to “ecological trees” that should not be
harvested). The idea is that farmers should plant trees that produce fruits or nuts. But a few
scattered “commercial trees” planted on steep terrain may not be sufficient to compensate
the losses from the set-aside cultivation land.
? Finally, it is quite unclear, how the reforested areas should be managed and used commer-
cially in the long run. Will the planted trees become property of the farmers, which they can
cut and sell after a few years? The program does not include a viable economic concept of
what the farmers could do with the converted areas after the program has ended. In fact,
they may re-convert the reforested areas to cropland again.
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The Grain for Green program is focused on environmental protection - not on poverty allevia-
tion. Instead of compensating some 15 million farmers for a questionable environmental pro-
gram, the government may consider to re-direct the money to the real poverty areas.
5. Expansion of Transportation Infrastructure
Roads are essential for economic development. Since 1985, the Chinese government has given
high priority to the construction of an effective transportation infrastructure. However, most of
the resources were used for the construction of high-quality roads and railways, such as high-
ways and fast-speed railways connecting the major industrial centers in the coastal provinces.
This development of expressways was quite spectacular: the total length increased from just
147 km in 1988 to 25,130 km in 2002. By contrast, the length of low-quality, mostly rural roads
increased by just 3% per year over the same period (Fan / Chang-Kang, 2005). Apparently,
China’s government is more interested in connecting already existing growth centers with ad-
equate transportation infrastructure, than in providing better access to (remote) rural areas.
Shenggen Fan and Connie Chang-Kang have analyzed the economic impact of China’s road
infrastructure development and found that the national GDP impact of low-level road construc-
tion would be roughly four times greater than the effect of the high-quality expressway con-
struction. In other words: for a more effective development it would be necessary to focus on the
development of rural (secondary) roads in Central and Western China and not on the construc-
tion of intercity highways in the East. The authors believe that the construction of lower-quality
roads in remote areas would especially benefit the rural poor.
Diagram 1: Major Types of Poverty and Corresponding Poverty Alleviation Methods
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Conclusions
China is currently undertaking the epochal transition from an agricultural to an industrial and
service-oriented society. As in all such transitions, a gap can open up between the development
of traditional and modern economic sectors. While modern industrial and service sectors are
growing rapidly, traditional sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, might be lagging behind.
China also faces this problem of a rural-urban income gap. In fact, in recent years, the gap
between rural and urban areas has been widening, in particular, because rural areas are mainly
located in China’s land-locked interior provinces, which have been developing much slower
than the (more urbanized) coastal areas. But the gap was even wider before the economic re-
forms of 1978/89. In any case, compared to other developing countries, China was extremely
successful in increasing rural income, and lifting millions of peasants out of poverty. In fact,
China should be a lesson to all those development experts, who believe poverty alleviation in
developing countries would primarily require big increases in development aid. Fact is, China
substantially reduced its poverty population simply by abandoning economic utopia and accept-
ing the basic rules of entrepreneurship and market mechanism.
Of course, as in (almost) any other country there is still severe poverty in China. This poverty,
however, seems to be largely restricted to rather specific areas and segments of the population.
As we have shown in our analysis, many poverty regions are located in mountain areas with
poor accessibility, deficient infrastructure, and great distance to major consumer markets. Con-
ditions for agriculture or animal husbandry are often very poor and there are few other economic
opportunities. Only tourism might become a new source of income - if the area has natural
beauty or historical and cultural monuments. Specifically targeted programs are necessery to
develop these areas and contribute to a further reduction of poverty in China.
From a conceptual point of view, it may be useful to distingush three types of poverty in modern
China (see Diagram 1):
The first type of poverty can be called “systemic”. It results from an inefficient, disfunctional
economic system that is isolated from the world economy. The history of the 20th century should
have taught us a lesson, that economic systems based on centralized command and control, with
absent or heavily distorted markets and lacking incentives are simply disfunctional. The former
USSR, Eastern Europe, Maoist China, and several copy-cat states in Africa after decolonization
(Tanzania, Egypt under Nasser), are examples. All these countries had experienced massive
economic crises or at least very slow economic growth which was a root cause of their poverty
(Dollar / Kray, 2002). The spectacular poverty alleviation in China since 1978 has been, first
and formost,  a reduction of  systemic poverty, as Deng Xiaoping essentially abandoned the
country’s planned economy and opened it up for foreign direct investment. While globalization
is still the “ultimate enemy” among intellectuals, or at least a subject of intense debates (Bardhan,
2004; Harrison / Rutherford / Tarr, 2003; Khan / Riskin, 2000), for China, it was clearly the
biggest poverty allievation program imaginable, as many millions of impoverished peasants
found jobs in the flourishing export industries. This should be a strong message to all those
countries that still have serious poverty: get your economy in order and open it up to global
trade!
The second type of poverty can be found almost everywhere in the world. It is related to specific
geographic, environmental, and agro-climatic conditions. In China, these are areas in the Pla-
teau regiona of Qinghai, in Tibet, Xinxiang, Guixhou, Guangxi, or Yunnan, but also in parts of
Inner Mongolia and in the Loess Plateau. These “poverty regions” usually have multiple natural
disadvantages: insufficient precipitation, a too cold or too hot climate, high altitude, steep slopes,
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chemical or mechanical soil constraints, hydrological problems (frequent flooding), or serious
water or wind erosion. Many of these areas are also very remote due to insufficient infrastruc-
ture or simply far away from population concentrations. People living in these kinds of areas
have always a greater risk of poverty than people living in fertile flood plains. For instance, in
Europe, mountain farmers are typically the poorest section of the population. Not much can be
done to alleviate this type of poverty. As long as people in these areas depend on agriculture or
animal husbandry the natural limitations determine their level of economic development. Of
course, it is possible to develop a non-agricultural local economy (such as tourism), but the
possibilities are limited. Better infrastructure would help, but in the end, temporary labor migra-
tion or permanent resettlement (facilitated by better infrastructure) is probably the only realistic
option of alleviating this type of poverty.
The third type of poverty is distributional poverty. It is caused by social and economic injustice,
cultural factors, or individual handicaps. This type of poverty can be also found everywhere in
the world - including the most advanced societies. It is certainly the most difficult and resistent
type of poverty, because very often it is associated with sentiments of guilt, inferiority, and
hopelessness among those who are affected. It can be deeply rooted in certain cultural character-
istics, such as the cast system in India. In that context, poverty is not only a economic or social
problem, but has a religious foundation and is consedered “punishment” for a previous exist-
ence. In this type of poverty we often find a vicious cycle, in which poor people become en-
tangled accross many generations. This inheritance of poverty is especially troubling, because
children raised under these conditions have little chance due to deficient education, lacking
social and economic skills and discrimination by other groups in the society. In China, this type
of poverty can be often found among certain stigmatized ethnic groups, which are considered
“backward” by the Han majority.  It is also typical for the homeless people roaming the streets of
big cities, begging or looking for jobs. Some of them may be uprooted migrant workers, who
left their families in the rural areas. Others are elderly unemployed workers who have lost their
jobs in the state-owned industries and are unable to compete in the modern private sector.  But
there are also physically or mentally handicaped living in poverty. Many homeless people actu-
ally have serious mental problems, but do not get proper treatment or care due to a lack of health
insurance.
The only realistic way out of this type of poverty are targeted support programs, particularly for
the children. It is absolutely essential that the children get proper basic education and training
for a job. It  is also necessary to bring better support and information to these population groups
- particularly concerning basic hygiene and health care (immuniztion against infectious dis-
eases), family planning, healthy nutrition (such as encouragement of breast-feeding) and access
to clean drinking water. The measures simply have to break the visious cycle of poverty, illit-
eracy, poor health, high infant mortality, and, ultimately, short life expectancy.
We have distinguished these three types of poverty, because in the current discussion we can
often find a rather naive approach to poverty alleviation, which considers increased foreign aid
as the central method in the developing world. While this may certainly be one of the necessary
measures, it is essential that poverty-affected countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America first
get their economic system in order, and secondly, develop a clear concept of regional develop-
ment - if necessary, including resettlement programs for people living in extremely disadvan-
taged regions. In a third step specific poverty alleviation measures are necessary that must be
highly targeted to improve basic living conditions, education, and health among the poverty
affected population. Just transfering foreing aid to corrupt or incompetent national or regional
governments will not help the poor.
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Appendix
Table A1: Average Annual Net Income Per Capita of Rural Residents, 1978-2003
Table A2: Average Annual Disposable Income Per Capita of Urban Residents, 1978-2003
Table A3: (4) Rural-Urban Ratio of Real Income; (5) Rural Engel Index; (6) Urban Engel Index; 1978-2003
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1978 133.6 100.0 133.6 1978 343.4 100.0 343.4 1978 2.57 67.7 57.5
1980 191.3 139.0 185.7 1980 477.6 127.0 436.1 1980 2.35 61.8 56.9
1985 397.6 268.9 359.3 1985 739.1 160.4 550.8 1985 1.53 57.8 53.3
1986 423.8 277.6 370.9 1986 899.6 182.5 626.7 1986 1.69
1987 462.6 292.0 390.1 1987 1,002.2 186.9 641.8 1987 1.65
1988 544.9 310.7 415.1 1988 1,181.4 182.5 626.7 1988 1.51
1989 601.5 305.7 408.4 1989 1,375.7 182.8 627.7 1989 1.54 54.8 54.5
1990 686.3 311.2 415.8 1990 1,510.2 198.1 680.3 1990 1.64 58.8 54.2
1991 708.6 317.4 424.0 1991 1,700.6 212.4 729.4 1991 1.72 57.6 53.8
1992 784.0 336.2 449.2 1992 2,026.6 232.9 799.8 1992 1.78 57.6 53.0
1993 921.6 346.9 463.5 1993 2,577.4 255.1 876.0 1993 1.89 58.1 50.3
1994 1,221.0 364.4 486.8 1994 3,496.2 276.8 950.5 1994 1.95 58.9 50.0
1995 1,577.7 383.7 512.6 1995 4,283.0 290.3 996.9 1995 1.94 58.6 50.1
1996 1,926.1 418.2 558.7 1996 4,838.9 301.6 1,035.7 1996 1.85 56.3 48.8
1997 2,090.1 437.4 584.4 1997 5,160.3 311.9 1,071.1 1997 1.83 55.1 46.6
1998 2,162.0 456.2 609.5 1998 5,425.1 329.9 1,132.9 1998 1.86 53.4 44.7
1999 2,210.3 473.5 632.6 1999 5,854.0 360.6 1,238.3 1999 1.96 52.6 42.1
2000 2,253.4 483.5 646.0 2000 6,280.0 383.7 1,317.6 2000 2.04 49.1 39.4
2001 2,366.4 503.8 673.1 2001 6,859.6 416.3 1,429.6 2001 2.12 47.7 38.2
2002 2,475.6 528.0 705.4 2002 7,702.8 472.1 1,621.2 2002 2.30 46.2 37.7
2003 2,622.2 550.7 735.7 2003 8,472.2 514.6 1,767.1 2003 2.40 45.6 37.0
Notes:
(1) Nominal Income at Current Prices, 1978-2001
(2) Real Income Index (1978=100)
(3) Real Income (1978 constant prices)
Columns (1) and (2) are from the China Statistical Yearook, 2004, Table 10-2
Column (3) is calculated by multiplying the real income incex (column 2) by the base year nominal income value.
(4) Urban-Rural Ratio of real income
(5) Engel Index for rural areas.
(6) Engel Index for urban areas.
Table A1: Rural Income Table A2: Urban Income Table A3: Various Indicators
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Rural (1) Urban (2) Urban-RuralRatio
National Average 2,622.2 8,472.2 3.2
Beijing 5,601.6 13,882.6 2.5
Tianjin 4,566.0 10,312.9 2.3
Hebei 2,853.4 7,239.1 2.5
Shanxi 2,299.2 7,005.0 3.0
Inner Mongolia 2,267.7 7,012.9 3.1
Liaoning 2,934.4 7,240.6 2.5
Jilin 2,530.4 7,005.2 2.8
Heilongjiang 2,508.9 6,678.9 2.7
Shanghai 6,653.9 14,867.5 2.2
Jiangsu 4,239.3 9,262.5 2.2
Zhejiang 5,389.0 13,179.5 2.4
Anhui 2,127.5 6,778.0 3.2
Fujian 3,733.9 9,999.5 2.7
Jiangxi 2,457.5 6,901.4 2.8
Shandong 3,150.5 8,399.9 2.7
Henan 2,235.7 6,926.1 3.1
Hubei 2,566.8 7,322.0 2.9
Hunan 2,532.9 7,674.2 3.0
Guangdong 4,054.6 12,380.4 3.1
Guangxi 2,094.5 7,785.0 3.7
Hainan 2,588.1 7,259.3 2.8
Chongqing 2,214.6 8,093.7 3.7
Sichuan 2,229.9 7,041.9 3.2
Guizhou 1,564.7 6,569.2 4.2
Yunnan 1,697.1 7,643.6 4.5
Tibet 1,690.8 8,765.5 5.2
Shaanxi 1,675.7 6,806.4 4.1
Gansu 1,673.1 6,657.2 4.0
Qinghai 1,794.1 6,745.3 3.8
Ningxia 2,043.3 6,530.5 3.2
Xinjiang 2,106.2 7,173.5 3.4
Notes:
(1) Per Capita Net Income of Rural Households (in Yuan)
(2) Per Capita Disposable Income of Urban Households (in Yuan)
Table A4: Per Capita Net (Disposable) Income of Rural 
and Urban Households, 2003
Source: CSY, 2004, Table 10-21 and Table 10-15

